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COURT OF APPEALS, 1955 TERM
soned that the plaintiff's offense fell, within sections 177 and 180 of the New York
Code of Criminal Procedure,5 rendering him liable to arrest without a warrant
and notice then as to his offense.
Judge Desmond, dissenting, argued that the policeman should have stated
the reason for arrest to the plaintiff, since section 180 can apply only to ".... grave
crimes . . . or public disorders or breaches of the peace where there can be no
uncertainty as to the cause." He deemed the plaintiff's offense clearly outside
such category. Arguing alternatively, he said that though classed as crimes for
jurisdiction purposes, traffic offenses are not susceptible to being termed crimes in
this context. Accordingly, the defendant still was not protected by section 180
and was therefore required to tell the plaintiff the nature of his offense when he
arrested him.
It would seem that logical statutory arguments can be framed for either side
in this case. For this reason, policy considerations must be weighed. As conceded
by the majority, it would have been reasonably simple for the officer to inform
the plaintiff why he was taking him into custody. Indeed, the majority recom-
mended this be done in such cases as a matter of administrative practise. The
dissent pointed out the minimal burden such requirement would place on law
officers, as contrasted to the "valuable and important right" one ordinarily has
to be told why he is arrested. Further, speeding can hardly be classified a "public
disorder" or "peace breach"-where one's very act apprises him of his offense-
regardless of the danger it may cause. For this reason and the small effort involved
in telling a traffic transgressor of his offense when arrested, the duty to inform
should be made mandatory with police officers.
Testamentary Libel
The rule that allegedly libelous matter is defamatory per se, "... if it tends
to expose the plaintiff to public contempt, ridicule, aversion or disgrace, or induce
an evil opinion of him in the minds of right-thinking people, and . . . deprive
him of their friendly intercourse .... ,, was applied by the Court of Appeals in
Brown v. DuFrey.7
5. N. Y. CODE CRIM. PROC. §177. A peace officer may, without a warrant,
arrest a person, (1.) For a crime, committed or attempted in his presence; N. Y.
CODE CRI. PROC. §180. [An officer] must state his authority and cause of arrest,
except where party is committing felony or is pursued after escape. When
arresting a person without a warrant the officer must inform him of the authority
of the officer and the cause of arrest, except when the. person is arrested in the
actual commission of a crime, or is pursued immediately after escape. (emphasis
added).
6. Mencher v. Ches7ey, 297 N. Y. 94, 75 N. E. 2d 257 (1947); Nichols v. Item
Publishers, 309 N. Y. 596, 132 N. E. 2d 860 (1956), 6 BUFFALO L. REv. 72 (1956).
7. 1 N. Y. 2d 190, 134 N. E. 2d 469 (1956).
BUPFALO LAW REVIEW
In holding for the plaintiff, who brought an action against the estate of his
former wife, the Court found defamatory material in her will which said that
the plaintiff had abandoned her and left her destitute during life. The Court
limited itself to considering whether or not the will contained libelous matter,
thus not holding specifically whether a cause of action in "testamentary libel"s may
be brought. In so holding, the Court said that counsel for the defendant had not
raised the latter issue in timely fashion below, so that it could not be considered
at this level.9 The dissenters limited themselves only to considering the point dealt
with by majority, but said the matter in issue was not libelous per se.
The Court's holding seems to fit readily into the traditional definition of
defamation per se1° and its concepts in the area of marital relations," Further,
it would seem that the decision impliedly recognizes such a cause of action against
a defendant estate, since one never loses his objection to a court's jurisdiction over
the subject matter of an action.12
Fair Comment
Fair comment, a policy measure protecting a free press, is a recognized
defense to libel actions in New York.' 3 This privilege protects a defendant who
comments on matters germane to public interest, provided: (1) the statement
made is a matter of comment or opinion rather than the assertion of a factual
proposition; (2) is based on facts truly stated; (3) is a fair and reasonable
inference from these facts, and (4) is made without actual malice.14
In the case of Julian v. American Business Consultants,1' the plaintiff alleged
he was libeled in defendant's book, which pictured him as a Communist "dupe"
8. The majority of reported cases have held a cause of action to exist
against the testator's estate, but not against the executor personally. Annot. 87
A. L. R. 234 (1933). A lower court case in New York has adhered to this view.
Brown v. Mack, 185 Misc. 368, 56 N. Y. S. 2d 910 (Sup. Ct. 1945). The case of
Citizens" and So. Nat'l Bank v. Hendricks, 176 Ga. 692, 168 S. E. 313 (1933), dis-
allowed a cause of action against the testator's estate.
9. N. Y. Civ. PRAc. AcT §446. Exception to the charge given to a jury by the
court or any part thereof and to the granting or refusal of requests to charge,
shall not be deemed to have been taken unless expressly noted by the party
adversely affected before the jury have rendered their verdict. See also Buckin
v. Long Island R. Co., 286 N. Y. 146, 36 N. E. 2d 88 (1941).
10. Mencher v. Chesley, 297 N. Y. 94, 75 N. E. 2d 257 (1947).
11. Keller v. Phillips, 39 N. Y. 351 (1868); Woolworth v. Star Co., 97 App.
Div. 525, 90 N. Y. Supp. 147 (1st Dep't 1904); O'Neill v. Star Co., 121 App. Dlv.
849, 106 N. Y. Supp. 973 (1st Dep't 1907).
12. Newham v. Chile Exploration Co., 232 N. Y. 37, 133 N. E. 120 (1921).
13. Briarcliff Lodge Hotel v. Citizen-Sentinel Publishers, 260 N. Y. 106, 183
N. E. 193 (1932); Hall v. Binghamton Press Co., 263 App. Div. 403, 33 N. Y. S,' 2d
840 (3d Dep't 1942), af'd., 296 N. Y. 714, 70 N. E. 2d 537 (1946).
14. See note 13, supra.
15. 2 N. Y. 2d 1, 137 N. E. 2d 1 (1956).
